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The Smuggling Career of William King
by
Alan S. Taylor
O ne of the most fascinating controversies to em erge 
from  M aine’s role in the W ar o f 1812 is w hether William 
King, the leader of M aine’s Democratic-Republican party 
and the state’s first governor, illegally traded  with the 
British. T h ro u g h o u t King’s political career, charges were 
hurled  that many of his vessels had operated  in violation 
o f  the  re v e n u e  laws. T h e se  ch a rg e s  re m a in e d  
unsubstantiated rum ors spread by his Federalist political 
opponents until 1824 when two o f his estranged political 
proteges, Benjam in Ames and Joseph F. W ingate, J r ., 
anonym ously published The Disclosure No. 1: Documents 
Relating to Violations and Evasions of the Laws During the 
Commercial Restrictions and Late War With Great Britain, etc., 
a collection o f letters and depositions in tended to prove 
that King and his good friend, Mark Langdon Hill, were 
indeed guilty o f smuggling. King and Hill responded with 
a denial o f the charges in a pam phlet published in 
Ja n u a ry , 1825. T h e  controversy  has raged  w ithout 
settlem ent ever since.
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For the New England Democratic-Republicans, the W ar 
of 1812 became a political albatross. T he declaration of 
war, passed by a Democratic-Republican Congress during  
the Madison adm inistration, was produced  by the clam or 
o f the agrarian, expansion-m inded, nationalistic states of 
the south and west. T he pro-w ar congressm en of those 
states could afford  to bask in self-congratulations for 
having struck a blow at British arrogance, but their 
political friends in New E ngland w ere caught in a 
m aelstrom  of public protest.
New England lived by m aritim e commerce. Shipping, 
with its a tten d an t concerns o f sh ipbuild ing, fishing, 
ro p em ak in g , and  lu m b erin g , was, in Sam uel Eliot 
M orison’s words, “T h e  one th ing  that had  enabled 
Yankees to lift themselves out o f a penury  incident to poor 
soil and harsh climate.”1 A fact o f nineteenth  century 
m aritim e com merce, well recognized by New England 
m erchants, was the overwhelm ing naval p reponderance of 
G reat Britain. Britain was mistress o f the seas, and could 
arrogantly  boast that not a single vessel sailed without her 
consent. As a consequence, New Englanders feared that 
war with that country would result in the destruction of 
their com merce and economic depression. For the sake of 
profits, New England m erchants had long end u red  the 
insults of G reat Britain, and they bitterly asked by what 
right the planters and backwoodsmen of the south and 
west had pushed the nation into war “for the sake of our 
com m ercial rights.”2
As much as the Federalists detested the thought o f war, 
they used it to revitalize the ir party. In  Massachusetts, of 
which Maine was then a part, they played upon public 
antipathy to the approaching conflict, and in April, 1812, 
they regained control o f the governorship and the House 
o f Representatives. With the declaration o f war, public 
o u tra g e  escala ted  an d  becam e rip e  fo r F ed era lis t 
p ropaganda characterizing the conflict as a southern  plot
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designed to destroy n o rth ern  com m erce—as part o f the 
“Virginia Anti-Com m ercial System” which had earlier 
m anifested itself in the Em bargo o f 1807-1809.3
New England Dem ocratic-Republicans were the victims 
o f events. In  the 1812 presidential and congressional 
elections, the Federalists failed to overtu rn  the dom inance 
o f their opponents, but in New England they scored a 
stunning  victory. Massachusetts cast 65 percent o f its vote 
fo r  M ad iso n ’s o p p o n e n t, D ew itt C lin to n ; an d  the  
Federalists won 15 o f M assachusetts’ 20 congressional 
seats. Even in consistently Dem ocratic-Republican Maine, 
the voters registered their discontent by ousting all th ree 
pro-w ar Dem ocratic-Republican incum bents. T he tren d  
persisted in the state elections o f 1813. T h e  incum bent 
Federalist governor, Caleb Strong, won by 14,000 votes on 
a p latform  em phasizing his thorough opposition to the 
w ar.4 Clearly, identification with the war and the M adison 
adm inistration was a political liability.
As if the local cost of political loyalty to the national 
party  leadership were not enough, private adherence to 
the war policies entailed potential financial ru in  for the 
m erchant-capitalists who com posed the leadership o f the 
M aine D em ocratic-R epublicans. Abiel W ood, J r .  o f 
Wiscasset thought that if King had been in Congress he 
surely would not have “given a vote o f destruction” to the 
interests o f his constituents. W ood, a m an about to go 
bank rup t within two years, expected “to lose from  ten to 
fifty thousand dollars by the w ar,” and he concluded, “I 
shall not be alone.”5
T h e  irresistible tem ptation to m erchants of both parties 
was that o f continuing pre-w ar trade th rough  extralegal 
channels. N either the English nor most Am ericans w anted 
com m erce to cease because o f the war. T he U nited States 
was the prim e source o f foodstuffs and lum ber products 
for the British West Indies, the M aritim e provinces of 
C anada, and, to a lesser extent, G reat Britain. T he U nited
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States relied on Britain fo r m anufactured  products, and  
on the British West Indies fo r sugar, rum , and molasses. 
H ence, w hen the  British adop ted  a policy allowing 
A m erican ships to continue trade with the em pire u n d er 
p ro te c tiv e  licen ses, th e  A m erican s  r e s p o n d e d  
enthusiastically. T he license system offered  im m unity 
from  attack by British warships am d privateers. Usually 
valid fo r six m onths, they could be used fo r any num ber o f 
voyages, to a specified port, within that period. They were 
issued by British royal governors, consuls, and naval 
com m anders for the W est Indies, the M aritimes, and the 
Iberian  peninsula.6 Initially, the licenses sold fo r $50.00, 
b u t on the black m arket they resold fo r as m uch as $1,250. 
O ften , a m erchant would purchase a license for a single 
voyage, an d  th en  resell it to a n o th e r  p r io r  to its 
exp ira tion .7
T ra d e  w ith B rita in  an d  h e r  colonies was legally 
prohib ited , bu t A m erican customs were easily bypassed by 
a variety o f  Yankee strategem s. T he standard  was to 
officially clear the vessel for St. Bartholomews, a neutral 
Swedish island in the C aribbean, and  then  proceed 
w herever desired. False re tu rn  clearances, ostensibly from  
St. Bartholom ews, were readily available from  British 
custom  officers. So great was the volume o f Am erican 
trade  supposedly flowing to the Lilliputian island o f St. 
Bartholom ews that its nam e becam e synonymous for trade 
with the British.8
T h e  alternative to British licenses was the rem arkably 
easy transfer o f A m erican vessels to neutral Swedish 
registry. T o  facilitate the glut o f such requests, the 
S w ed ish  g o v e rn m e n t a p p o in te d  P eleg  T a llm an , a 
Dem ocratic-Republican m erchant from  Bath, and form er 
business p artn e r o f King’s, as its vice consul for the District 
o f  M aine.9
T h e  license system was an extension o f British political 
as well as economic policy. Anxious to see trade continue,
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the British were determ ined  that anti-war New England 
would benefit from  it. They usually limited the issuance of 
licenses to New Englanders, and  excluded the region from  
th e ir  naval blockades, thereby allowing the licensed 
m erchant vessels to come and go. British policy was 
designed to rew ard anti-war feelings, generate pro-British 
sentim ent in New England, and encourage sectional 
jealousy am ong the states of the Union. T he policy was so 
successful that it all but neutralized the American war 
e f fo r t  in New E n g lan d . A p p eased  by c o n tin u e d  
com m erce, and the absence of British attacks upon their 
coast, most New Englanders p referred  to believe they 
were not in the midst o f  a real war. For them , the conflict 
was the problem  of the pro-w ar states; New E ngland’s 
business was to continue trad ing  with the world as best she 
cou ld .10
Despite several dram atic naval victories, the U nited 
States could not overcome the overwhelm ing superiority 
of the Royal Navy in American waters. A lthough Congress 
m ade the use o f British licenses illegal, enough Republican 
congressm en jo ined  with the Federalists to defeat a bill 
which would have put teeth in the law by authorizing the 
navy to seize American vessels operating under such 
licenses.11 Consequently, the British virtually dictated 
Am erican commercial policy. Com m erce moved safely 
only where they licensed it to go—that is, to areas where 
their armies needed provisions. T he United States was 
im potent to stop the trade which so materially aided the 
enem y war effort because public sentim ent refused to 
coun tenance the ex trao rd in a ry  m easures needed  to 
su p p ress it. Q uite sim ply, A m erican w illingness to 
e lim in a te  th e  illegal co m m erce  was w orse th a n  
half-hearted. Reflecting this, the policy o f the Madison 
adm inistration was typically confused and inconsistent, 
resulting in tacit to leration .12
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Existing Am erican revenue laws were utterly ineffective 
in deterring  smuggling. As a result o f the prevailing belief 
that smuggling was not all that morally reprehensible, the 
penalties were limited to confiscation o f the offending 
vessels and their cargoes. T h e  relative infrequency of 
seizures, the inexpensive and plentiful supply o f wooden 
ships of the day, the ready availability o f insurance to 
underw rite  the risk, and the opportunity  to repurchase 
the vessel and cargo at public auction for a fraction o f their 
value, were all factors m aking confiscation ineffective 
against sm uggling during  times of inordinate profits. 
T h ere  were occasions when owners inform ed on their own 
vessels in o rd er to legalize the cargoes. Since their fellow 
m erchants would refuse to bid on the confiscated vessel 
and  cargo, the owners were able to repurchase for a low 
price at auction, while receiving a rew ard for having 
in fo rm ed .13
W ar did not halt Anglo-Am erican trade; it forced it into 
semi-legal channels. Shipping was the backbone o f M aine’s 
economy, and her com mercial com m unity accom odated 
itself to the wartime situation in term s dictated more 
by economic necessity than by patriotic fervor. Only 
subsistence farm ers could afford  to be war zealots, but 
even many o f them , attracted by high beef prices in 
Canada, drove their cattle th rough the forest to Quebec 
an d  New B ru n sw ick .14 M erchan ts o f both parties , 
w hatever their attitudes tow ard the war, were determ ined 
to conduct their business as best they could. T he British 
license system, coupled with A m erican inability and 
re lu c ta n c e  to su p p re ss  it, allow ed  th e  m e rc h a n t 
com m unity to continue a limited trade with the British 
Em pire.
As a ride, the m erchan ts  d id  not profit by the 
ex traord inary  conditions. T he high prices paid for cargoes 
at both ends o f the illicit voyages were largely offset by 
increased risks and the reduced flow of commerce. T he
24
level o f trade was largely controlled by the num ber of 
licenses the British chose to issue. T hat these were 
insufficient to meet the dem and is indicated by the high 
prices paid fo r them  on the second hand  m arket. 
Generally, only the wealthier m erchants who plied the 
m ore lucrative trade routes could afford  them. Small 
coasters, the principal means of transportation in New 
England, had to cling to the coast to avoid pursuit and 
cap ture by British cruisers and privateers. Because the 
license system  was in c o n v en ie n t an d  b o th e rso m e , 
Am erican m erchants all but universally longed for a 
re tu rn  to peace.
Maine, an underpopulated  frontier region bordering  on 
Canada, and amply endowed with good harbors, became a 
hotbed of smuggling. “T he District of Maine has become a 
resort and hiding place for such traitors,” Portland’s 
Dem ocratic-Republican paper, the Eastern Argus, rag ed .15 
In addition to the license and “neu tra l” export trade 
sailing from  Maine ports to British possessions, a great 
volume of American trade flowed up the coast from  the 
mid-Atlantic states to the Canadian border at Eastport. 
D uring the night, great quantities o f American foodstuffs 
and British dry goods crossed the Passamaquoddy Bay 
border in an arm ada of open boats. In short, Eastport 
served as a portal o f exchange for the two belligerents due 
to active British encouragem ent, and the inability o f the 
Americans to stop it.16
T he official view of the Democratic-Republican party 
was that the nation was engaged in a life-and-death 
struggle requiring the patriotic sacrifice of self-interest. 
T he Democratic-Republican press treated sm uggling as a 
Federalist plot to underm ine  the war e ffo rt.17 T he 
Federalist position more nearly reflected the economic 
realities of the time. The Democratic-Republican attem pt 
in Congress to allow the navy to seize licensed vessels was 
labeled “T he Finishing Stroke” by the Portland Gazette.
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It insisted that it would “completely exclude the U nited 
States Flag from  the ocean and speedily heal up those 
great sores’ (seaports) which Jefferson  considered so 
destructive to the body politic.”18 T he custom officers, 
generally Dem ocratic-Republican appointees, were not 
very popular along the coast. Because they received a 
share o f whatever they seized, they were perceived as 
g re e d y  p a ra s ite s  fe e d in g  o f f  h o n e s t co m m erce  
unfortunately  forced into illegal channels.19
T h e  Federalist press considered Dem ocratic-Republican 
attacks on sm uggling practices as hypocritical and u n ­
reasonable. In  Ju n e , 1814, the Portland Gazette asserted, 
“T h e  Argus is continually harp ing  about smugglers and 
gives strong intim ations that the Federalists are the only 
people concerned in the violation of the laws. Beware 
Doctor, or some o f your patients will get a blistering! A 
great Democrat, not m ore than  thirty-seven miles from  
this, can be nam ed who has done m ore at this business 
than  all the Federalists in M assachusetts.” Bath lies 
th ir ty -sev en  m iles from  P o rtlan d , an d  the  “g rea t 
D em ocrat” could only be William King.20
Rum ors that William King was inclined to defy the 
com m ercial restrictions enacted by his party, described by 
M ark Langdon Hill as “all those old woman stories which 
the Feds at Bath and elsewhere had prom ulgated with a 
view to re n d e r  you u n p o p u la r ,” w ere revived and 
c irc u la te d  at e lec tio n  tim e by K in g ’s F ed e ra lis t 
opponen ts.21 U nfortunately for K ing’s reputation, Judge 
Hill was a poor character reference. His vessels had, on at 
least two occasions, violated the em bargo and n o n ­
intercourse laws.22
Next to Eastport, Bath was the most notorious Maine 
p o rt for trad in g  with the enem y. T he Dem ocratic- 
Republican Hallowell Advocate noted, “We have known 
several vessels direct from  enemy ports, with English 
m anufactures, en ter the po rt o f Bath, in defiance of law,
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and instead o f vigorous treatm ent, the owners have in 
some instances had their goods appraised at not a th ird  
their value, bonded for this small am ount and delivered 
u p .11 T he bonds paid for such “illegal im porta tion” were 
equal if not less than the duties on legal im ports. T h e  
Advocate raged, “In this m anner desperate adventurers 
have unjustly been enabled to accum ulate fortunes, while 
the honest and regular citizen is laboring under the 
p rivations inc iden t to the  state o f  o u r  com m ercial 
concerns.”23
T h o se  “ d e s p e ra te  a d v e n tu r e r s ” w ere  p r im a r ily  
Dem ocratic-Republican m erchants whose illicit com m erce 
existed due to the connivance of B ath’s Democratic- 
R ep u b lican  custom  co llec to r, J o sh u a  W ingate , J r .  
In his jo u rn a l for February 12, 1814, Bath resident 
Zina Hyde noted, “A num ber o f vessels were com plained 
of fo r having traded  at B erm uda, an English port, they 
having recently arrived with sugars; Messrs. G reen, J.F . 
W ingate, Benjam in Ames, Robinson, K—g, and others 
in terested .” T he Bath m erchants traded  with the British 
West Indies and the M aritimes, but the bulk o f the ir 
wartime com m erce was with B erm uda.24 A pparently , 
licenses for B erm uda were fairly prevalent since the 
British needed food and  lum ber to supply their im portan t 
military and naval base. B erm uda consequently becam e an 
em porium  where Am erican produce was exchanged for 
molasses, rum , sugar, coffee, tea, and  the m anufactu red  
goods so greatly dem anded  in the U nited States.
Only two Bath-owned vessels were seized by A m erican 
customs. T he first was the schooner Ovarian. O w ned by 
Benjam in Ames and Joseph  F. W ingate, J r ., it was seized 
on suspicion o f trad ing  with B erm uda. Ames obtained its 
release with several fraudu len t depositions asserting that it 
had sailed to and from  St. Bartholom ews in accordance 
with its clearance. Subsequent testim ony before a Senate
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Judiciary Com mittee investigation, however, placed Ames 
and  the Ovarian in B erm uda.25
T he second vessel was William King’s Reunion which was 
seized for violation o f the pre-w ar non-intercourse laws 
banning  trade with the British Empire. In late 1811, acting 
on inform ation derived from  his political friends in 
Congress, King slyly sent two ships, the Reunion and the 
Resen>e, to the British West Indies on the assum ption that 
the non-intercourse laws would be suspended by war or by 
congressional action before their re tu rn . Neglecting to 
take the serpentine pace o f Congress into account, the 
captain o f the Reunion b rough t the vessel back in January  
and it was seized. King, however, repurchased  the vessel at 
public auction. T he Reserve took a m ore leisurely pace in 
r e tu rn in g  fro m  B ritish  h e ld  M artin iq u e  u n d e r  a 
fraudu len t Puerto Rican clearance. It arrived hom e in 
August, 1812, after war had  been declared.26 A lthough 
the vessel was not seized, revenue officer, Phillip U lm er of 
Lincolnville gave King considerable concern by attem pting 
to open an investigation into the voyage. Phillip’s brother, 
George Ulmer, a noted Hancock County Democratic- 
Republican friendly to William King, apologized for his 
b ro th e r’s action noting that, “ . . .he will do anything for 
m oney”. George speculated, “I presum e that scoundrel of 
a m ate has been to him, and the hopes o f getting 
som ething to themselves, induces them  to go on .”27
A rift in the ranks of the M aine Democratic-Republicans 
in 1824 revived the question of King’s wartime smuggling 
and produced  an enduring  controversy. By 1824 Maine 
had become a separate state, and King had served briefly 
as its first governo r. In  the  fall o f th a t year the 
Dem ocratic-Republican party fractured  when Andrew 
Jackson, William Craw ford, and Jo h n  Quincy Adams 
scram bled for succession to the presidency o f Jam es 
M onroe. K ing stood by C raw ford , bu t his political 
proteges, Joseph  F. W ingate, J r ., and Benjam in Ames
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broke with his leadership  in Maine to successfully push 
A dam s’s cam paign.28
Ju s t before the cam paign, the ir patronage appointm ents 
expired. W ingate held the lucrative post o f collector o f the 
p o rt o f Bath which he had  held since 1820, a fte r 
su c c e e d in g  his u n c le  J o s h u a  W in g a te . M o n ro e  
renom inated  both Ames and  W ingate, but when an 
investigation by the Senate Judiciary  Com m ittee disclosed 
the extent of their wartim e B ath-B erm uda trade, the 
Senate rejected both nom inations. M ark Langdon Hill was 
appoin ted  in lieu o f W ingate. Em bittered, Ames and 
W ingate a ttribu ted  the ir rejection to William King's 
in te r fe re n c e  an d  in flu en ce . T o  avenge th is , they  
anonym ously published the ir pam phlet in Decem ber, 
1824, docum enting their accusation that King and Hill 
had also evaded the nation’s revenue laws.29
T h e ir pam phlet was a hastily com piled collection o f 
diverse m aterial, gathered from  the ra th e r large num ber 
o f employees who had fallen out with the hard-driv ing  
William King. Much was m ere hearsay, and m uch of the 
rest was laughable. For exam ple, one of the laborers on 
King's farm  claimed that K ing’s potatoes were being 
shipped to B erm uda because, “some . .were black, and 
Mr. King said he did not know as the black ones would do 
to ship to the Negroes in the West Indies, with the rest, on 
account o f the ir colour” 30 But, some of it drove hom e, 
particularly two letters o f instructions w ritten by King in 
1811 to David Foote, one o f his sea captains. O ne le tter 
d irected, “should you consider it necessary, you may go 
down to St. Bartholom ews for a clearance, though I do not 
consider it myself necessary. You may as well get a 
clearance at Dominica [the true destination o f the voyage] 
p u rp o rtin g  to be from  St. Bartholom ews as you go 
dow n.”31
T h e  bulk of the pam phlet attem pted  to show that after 
the war broke out, King carried  on his illicit trade using the
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firm  of Peter H. G reen and William Em erson as a front. 
G reen and Em erson were form er employees, and Em erson 
had  served as King's chief clerk until at least Septem ber, 
1812.32 They chartered  a num ber o f vessels, particulary the 
Tobias and Two Sisters, to make several B erm uda voyages 
lo a d e d  w ith  lu m b e r an d  p o ta to e s , u n d e r  St. 
Bartholom ew s^ clearances. As King adm itted, the potatoes 
came from  his farm  and were loaded onto the ships at his 
riverfron t w harf in Bath. T h e  issue was w hether King 
directed and financed Em erson and G reen’s com m erce 
with B erm uda and the British West Indies, not w hether his 
own vessels traded  with enem y.33
Disclosure No. I created a public u p ro ar which spu rred  
King and Hill to hastily publish, in January  o f 1825, their 
refu tations in a pam phlet entitled Remarks Upon a Pam­
phlet Published at Bath, Maine. Relating to Alleged Infractions 
of the Laws during the Embargo, Non-Intercourse, and War. 
King directly refu ted  only the weakest points o f the 
W ingate-Am es case, while attacking its credibility as a 
whole. He em phasized the w ell-grounded evidence that 
his accusers, and most o f the ir witnesses, were themselves 
deeply involved in the illicit com m erce. Since W ingate and 
Ames had already been discredited by the Senate Judiciary 
C om m ittee’s exposure o f their activities, K ing’s line of 
defense shrewdly m ade their pam phlet appear to be 
th e  v in d ic tiv e  p ro d u c tio n  o f reck less, d e s p e ra te  
opportun ists .34
King’s approach was so successful that historians have 
tended  e ith er to bypass the issue or to regard  the 
accusations as the bom bast o f d isappointed politicians 
venting their fury at a g reater m an.35 T he fact that his 
pam phlet ignores the most telling evidence m ustered by 
W ingate and Ames is neglected. King makes no m ention 
o f the dam ning letters of instruction w ritten by him self to 
Captain Foote; instead he focuses on a later incident 
w here Foote supposedly defrau d ed  him by accepting a
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British bribe to disclose the true  A m erican papers o f one 
of his Swedish registered vessels.36
K ing’s response to the w ell-founded charge that du rin g  
the war he had shipped potatoes and lum ber to B erm uda 
th rough  Em erson and G reen was less than  a page in length, 
and  utterly  lacking in supporting  docum entation. It boiled 
down to one sophistic sentence: “This vessel [the Two Sisters] 
as well as the Tobias and  many others loaded at my w harf; 
and  from  the circumstances o f a quantity o f potatoes, raised 
on a farm  of mine, having been purchased, and probably 
loaded on board this vessel, it is not found difficult to find 
persons to swear, that they believe I must have been 
interested in the voyage.” By carefully avoiding m ention of 
who owned or chartered  the vessels, King neither directly 
denied nor affirm ed that Em erson and G reen conducted 
his illicit trade. In short, he avoided m entioning Em erson 
and G reen who had been the focus o f the W ingate and 
Ames pam phlet.37
I f  King were to be ju d g ed  solely on the evidence 
m arshalled by W ingate and Ames, his reputation  would be 
tarnished, but no clear cut verdict o f guilty could be given. 
These two scoundrels themselves were deeply involved in 
the illicit com m erce. O th e r  evidence, how ever, has 
surfaced which indicates that King did indeed resort to 
extra-legal m ethods to carry on his business du ring  the 
war.
In  re search in g  the life o f  Jam es M adison fo r  a 
biography, Irving B rant discovered a le tter w ritten du rin g  
the war by Captain Joshua Barney. While privateering  in 
the Carribean, Barney encountered  a vessel re tu rn in g  
from  British-held M artinique with a cargo of molasses, 
only half o f which was en tered  in its official clearance. T h e  
sh ip ’s captain bluntly w arned Barney that the vessel 
belonged to King and that, “no person dared  to seize her: 
if they did Mr. M adison being his friend would o rd er her 
release.” Barney had no choice but to let the vessel
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proceed. Caustically referring  to King as “what men call a 
good D em ocrat,” Barney m uttered  that he “found this 
m ode o f defraud ing  the revenue to be a general thing to 
the east w ard .” Certainly, fo r the M adison adm inistration 
to have publicly em b ra rrassed  one o f its fo rem ost 
supporters in New England for what was com m on practice 
a m o n g  b o th  F e d e ra lis t an d  D em o c ra tic -R ep u b lic  
m erchants would have been political stupidity .38
Six docum ents in the William King papers are ju s t as 
dam ning. T he first, dated Septem ber 29, 1813, is the 
charter o f the brig Leander from  Charles Clapp and 
T hom as Agry o f Bath for a voyage “to the West Indies and 
back.” Significantly, the docum entt bears the signature o f 
William King together with those of Joseph F. W ingate, 
William Em erson and Peter H. Green as the charter party, 
thus indicating King’s involvement in their trade with the 
West Indies. William Avery B aker’s Maritime History of Bath 
indicates that the Leander proceeded to the British island 
o f Antigua. T he W ingate-Ames pam phlet included the 
Leander c h a rte r  bu t clumsily crossed o u t W ingate’s 
signature. In his published rebuttal, King adm itted that he 
ow ned an interest in the brig, while denying that he had 
anything to do with the direction of the voyage.39
T h e  second docum ent is a bond dated O ctober 4, 1813, 
which King, Em erson, and G reen posted for im porting 
goods from  St. Johns, New Brunswick, aboard the brig 
Margaretta. It substantiates the charge o f the Hallowell 
Advocate that Bath m erchants im ported British goods with 
the collusion Joshua F. W ingate J r ., the collector of 
customs. T he docum ent bears his signature and clearly 
states that the goods came from  St. Jo h n s.40
A letter w ritten by Charles T appan , a Portsm outh 
m erchant, to Captain Preble on Septem ber 9, 1873, casts 
fu rth e r light on the bond. At the beginning o f the war, 
T ap p an  had dispatched his brig, the Margaretta to Sweden
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to change her registry. He then  em ployed her in the trade 
between Bath and St. Johns. In  Septem ber, 1813, he h ired  
the British w arship Boxer for £100 to escort the vessel to 
Bath as protection from  Am erican privateers, and upon 
reaching the m outh of the Kennebec the Boxer fired 
several cannon shots to create the illusion that it was 
chasing ra th e r  than  convoying the brig. T h e  shots 
attracted the nearby Am erican naval brig Enterprise and 
the fam ous naval battle ensued. Both captains were killed, 
but the Enterprise prevailed. T appan  asserts that the 
Margaretta was carrying British woolen blankets and that 
the U nited States governm ent winked at the com m erce, 
because o f the  A m erican  a rm y ’s cry ing  n eed  fo r  
blankets.41 T he King bond supports that assertion and 
indicates that T appan  was im porting the British goods for 
King, Em erson, and Green.
T h e  most significant o f the docum ents are four letters 
from  King’s agent in Boston, Jo h n  Wood. T he first, 
dated October, 1813, discusses W ood’s inability to p rocure 
a B ritish pro tective license which King w anted for 
G uadeloupe, a French Carribean island cap tured  by the 
British du ring  the Napoleonic wars. W ood proposed that, 
while he continued to search the Boston m arket for the 
right license, King should p repare  the unnam ed brig to 
sail as soon as a license was ready.42 T h e  second letter, 
d a ted  O ctober 29, 1813, reveals W ood’s co n tin u ed  
frustration  in trying to find a license for G uadeloupe. He 
was optimistic o f several arriving in a few days.43 Yet, by 
N ovem ber 18, 1813, when the th ird  letter was written, 
W ood still had not obtained the G uadeloupe license for 
the brig and proposed, instead, that King buy an available 
license for B erm uda.44 Since no fu rth e r m ention o f the 
brig is m ade in W ood’s subsequent correspondence King 
did perhaps send her to Berm uda.
T h e  sixth docum ent is ano ther letter from  W ood, dated 
Decem ber 10, 1813. It discloses his inability to procure
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a license for King’s vessel, the Reserve. Revealing his 
expectation that several licenses for Jam aica would arrive 
soon, W ood proposed an intricate scheme for sending the 
ship to Jam aica; from  Jam aica to H avanna, to be pu t 
u n d er neutral Spanish registry; and then to either Cades, 
Spain or Liverpool, England!45
All four letters make clear that W ood was merely acting 
as an agent in these m atters; the final decisions were 
K ing’s. T he chief significance of the letters is that they 
dem onstrate that King was in close touch with an agent 
w hom  he had  in stru c ted  to p ro cu re  illegal B ritish 
protective licenses to enable him to trade with the British 
W est Indies. It proves that, contrary  to his 1824 pam phlet, 
he was not only well aware that his vessels were trad ing  
with enemy, but that he actively directed their voyages.
So, William King was the most p rom inen t o f the 
thousands in Maine who in one way or another, earned  
the ir livings by trading  with the British. This is hardly an 
astonishing revelation, given the facts that King owed his 
econom ic survival before and after the war to trade with 
the British Em pire, and  that du ring  the war virtually all his 
com petito rs were doing exactly the same. It would 
certainly be erroneous to think of King’s activities in term s 
o f the image which the word “sm uggler” conjures up, that 
o f a desperate and secretive criminal netting enorm ous 
profits from  his daring  skill at eluding the law. Rather, he 
was a shrewd businessm an who p referred  profits to the 
private consistency with public politics which bankrup ted  
his fellow Maine Republican m erchant, Congressm an 
Richard Cutts of Saco. D uring the Em bargo, when King’s 
ships could not leave port, he estim ated his losses at $5,558 
a m on th .46 In the subsequent period of non-intercourse 
and then war, King dem onstrated  a determ ination  to 
profitably conduct his business despite the restrictive 
revenue laws.
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It should also be rem em bered  that the policy o f the 
Madison adm inistration tow ard the license trade was 
anything but consistent, and the attitude prevailed in New 
England during  the war that there  was nothing w rong 
with trad ing  with Britain. While longing to in jure the 
British econom y by shutting o ff Am erican trade, the 
Madison adm inistration had to face political reality. Many 
of its supporters relied upon a continuation of the trade, 
and the U nited States required  British m anufactured  
goods and  colonial produce. While it is disconcerting to 
think that Bath potatoes may have fed the arm y which 
burned  W ashington, the reverse o f the coin is that British 
blankets, illegally im ported th rough  Bath, covered the 
Am erican invaders o f Canada.
I f  King can be faulted, it is for the hypocritical clash 
between his politics and business practices. H ad he been 
yet ano ther m erchant, there would be noth ing  ex tra ­
ordinary about his conduct; but as M aine’s forem ost 
D em ocratic-R epublican  — the party  which enacted  
commercial restrictions and cham pioned the war — it 
was inconsistent and  a po ten tia l source o f political 
em barrassm en t. W hile the Eastern Argus v igorously 
adhered  to the party line, blasting wartime trade with 
Britain as a treasonous Federalist plot, its principal 
financial backer was deeply involved in the trade. King 
was a symbol of his party, and the public expected that 
his political loyalty would impose a private consistency 
with the policies o f his party.
T he clash between King’s business conduct and his 
politics resulted from  the predicam ent in which the war 
p laced  h im  an d  his fellow D em o cra tic -R ep u b lican  
m erchants. Economic survival dictated evasion of the 
policies enacted by the Dem ocratic-Republican politicians 
of the south and west. K ing’s com prom ise was not unique. 
As a politician and military officer, he did his best to stand 
by the national leadership, but in his private affairs he
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p refe rred  solvency over strict adherence to the revenue 
laws. In his official capacity as a governm ent agent, he was 
in the unusual position o f instructing the United States 
com m ander at Eastport, Colonel George Ulmer, to sup­
press vigorously the sm uggling there, while, as a private 
m erchant, dispatching his own vessels to trade with the 
B ritish .47 T h e re  is no m ore fitting  sym bol o f the 
d isco m fo rt an d  am biguous reac tio n  o f the  M aine 
Democratic-Republicans towards the war.
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